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Abstract 
An ad hoc network is a collection of nodes that do not need to rely on a predefined 
infrastructure to keep the network connected. Nodes communicate amongst each other 
using wireless radios and operate by following a peer-to-peer network model. In this 
article we propose a multifold node authentication approach for protecting mobile ad 
hoc networks. The security requirements for protecting data link and network layers are 
identified and the design criteria for creating secure ad hoc networks using multiple 
authentication protocols are analysed. Such protocols, which are based on zero 
knowledge and challenge response techniques, are presented through proofs and 
simulation results.   
 
Keywords: ad hoc networks, security issues, link and network layers, authentication. 
 
1. Introduction 
Unlike traditional mobile wireless networks, ad hoc networks do not rely on a fixed 
infrastructure but on each other to keep the network connected. Such networks are also 
referred to as mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) [7]. Unlike networks using dedicated 
nodes to support basic functions like packet forwarding, routing, and network 
management, in ad hoc networks those functions are carried out by all available nodes 
[6, 7]. 
 
So far, applications of MANETs have been proposed mainly for crisis solutions (e.g., in 
the battlefield or in rescue operations). In these applications, all the nodes of the 
network belong to a single authority (e.g. a single military unit or a rescue team). With 
the progress of technology, however, it is possible to deploy MANET for civilian 
applications as well [4, 7, 23]. Examples include networks of cars and provision of 
communication facilities in remote areas. In these networks, the nodes do not 
necessarily belong to a single authority. In addition, these networks could be larger, 
have a longer lifetime, and they could be completely self-organized, meaning that the 
network could be run by the operation of the end-users.  
 
Since ad hoc networks can be deployed rapidly and several sensitive applications are 
investigated in this environment, important security issues are raised. The security 
requirements in ad hoc networks are different than the ones used for fixed networks. 
While the security requirements are the common ones, namely availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation, they are considered 
differently for ad hoc networks due to system constraints in mobile devices (i.e. low 
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power microprocessor, small memory and bandwidth, small battery life) and frequent 
network topology changes in the network. 
 
In this article, we seek to identify the security issues and attacks in MANETs and also 
examine the adaptation of cryptographic protocols in the data link and network layers. A 
multifold node authentication approach is proposed which implements multiple lines of 
defense against malicious attacks. Section 2 discusses the security challenges and attack 
types that exist in ad hoc networks. It also presents the security mechanisms 
implemented at the link and network layer with respect to the requirements of MANET.  
 
Section 3 describes the multifold node authentication approach and discusses how 
challenge-response and zero knowledge cryptographic protocols can be applied. Section 
4 presents a timing analysis of specific zero knowledge and challenge response 
protocols to compare the execution time for one-hop multifold authentication. 
Furthermore, section 5 concludes with remarks and comments on the unexplored 
security areas for MANET.  
 
2. Security Challenges in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
Security in ad hoc networks is difficult to be achieved due to their nature. The 
vulnerability of the links, the limited physical protection of each of the nodes, the 
sporadic nature of connectivity, the dynamically changing topology, the absence of a 
certification authority, and the lack of a centralized monitoring or management point 
make data authenticity, integrity, and confidentiality difficult to achieve [7].  
 
Similar to other wireless networks, ad hoc networks are susceptible to passive and 
active attacks [1, 4, 7, 23]. Passive attacks typically involve only eavesdropping of data, 
whereas active attacks involve actions performed by adversaries such as replication, 
modification and deletion of exchanged data. In particular, attacks in ad hoc networks 
have as target to cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing information, prevent 
services from working properly or shut them down completely [11, 12, 13, 25].  
 
Nodes that perform active attacks with the aim of damaging other nodes by causing 
network outage are considered to be malicious, also referred to as compromised, while 
nodes that perform passive attacks with the aim of saving battery life for their own 
communications are considered to be selfish. A selfish node affects the normal 
operation of the network by not participating in the routing protocols or by not 
forwarding packets as in the so called black hole attack [11, 12, 13, 17, 23]. 
 
Compromised nodes can interrupt the correct functioning of a routing protocol by 
modifying routing information, by fabricating false routing information and by 
impersonating other nodes. Recent research studies have also brought up a new type of 
attack that goes under the name of wormhole attack [10, 18, 19, 23, 26]. In the latter, 
two compromised nodes create a tunnel (or wormhole) that is linked through a private 
connection and thus they manage to by-pass the network. This allows a node to short-
circuit the normal flow of routing messages creating a virtual vertex cut in the network 
that is controlled by the two attackers.  
 
On the other hand, selfish nodes can severely degrade network performance and 
eventually partition the network by simply not participating in the network operation. 
Compromised nodes can easily perform integrity attacks by altering protocol fields in 
order to subvert traffic, denying communication to legitimate nodes and compromising 
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the integrity of routing computations in general. Spoofing is a special case of integrity 
attacks whereby a compromised node impersonates a legitimate one due to the lack of 
authentication in the current ad hoc routing protocols [10, 18, 20].  
 
The main result of a spoofing attack is the misrepresentation of the network topology 
that may cause network loops or partitioning. Lack of integrity and authentication in 
routing protocols creates fabrication attacks that result in erroneous and bogus routing 
messages [14].  
 
Denial of service (DoS) is another type of attack, in which the attacker injects a large 
amount of junk packets into the network. These packets consume a significant portion 
of network resources, and introduce wireless channel contention and network contention 
in ad hoc networks [4, 7, 23]. 
 
2.1. Security Issues in the Data Link Layer 
It is essential to distinguish the relevance of security mechanisms implemented in the 
data link layer with respect to the requirements of MANET. Two different environments 
can be identified in which the security mechanisms can potentially be deployed: 802.11 
or Bluetooth [17] and mobile ad hoc networks. 
 
The main requirement for data link layer security mechanisms is the need to cope with 
the lack of physical security on the wireless segments of the communication 
infrastructure. The data link layer is then completely justified as a means of building a 
‘wired equivalent’ security as stated by the objectives of wireless equivalent privacy 
(WEP) of 802.11. Data link layer mechanisms like the ones provided by 802.11 and 
Bluetooth basically serve for access control and privacy enhancements to cope with the 
vulnerabilities of radio communication links. However, data link security performed at 
each hop cannot meet the end-to-end security requirements of applications either where 
802.11 or Bluetooth protects wireless links or on physically protected wired links.  
 
The existence of several types of cryptographic attacks due to misuse of the 
cryptographic primitives have identified vulnerabilities in WEP. The 802.11 protocol is 
vulnerable to DoS attacks where the adversary may exploit its binary exponential back-
off scheme to deny access to the wireless channel from its local neighbors. In addition, a 
continuously transmitting node can always capture the channel and cause other nodes to 
back off endlessly which can trigger a chain reaction from upper layer protocols (e.g. 
TCP window management) [2, 15]. 
 
Another DoS attack is also applicable in 802.11 with the use of the network allocation 
vector (NAV) field, which indicates the channel reservation, carried in the request to 
send/clear (RTS/CTS) frames. The adversary may overhear the NAV information and 
then intentionally introduce a 1-bit error into the victim’s link layer frame by wireless 
interference [2, 15]. 
 
In the case of mobile ad hoc networks, there are trusted and non-trusted environments. 
In the trusted environment, the nodes of the ad hoc network are controlled by a third 
party and can thus be trusted based on authentication. Data link layer security is 
justified in this case by the need to establish a trusted infrastructure based on logical 
security means. If the integrity of higher layer functions implemented by the trusted 
nodes can be assured, then data link layer security can even meet the security 
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requirements raised by higher layers including routing and application protocols [1, 4, 7, 
13, 23].  
 
In non-trusted environments, on the other hand, trust in higher layers like routing or 
application protocols cannot be based on data link layer security mechanisms. The only 
relevant use of the latter appears to be node-to-node authentication and data integrity as 
required by the routing layer. Moreover, the main constraint in the deployment of 
existing data link layer security solutions (i.e. 802.11 and Bluetooth) is the lack of 
support for automated key management which is mandatory in open environments 
where manual key installation is not suitable. 
 
Regardless of the type of environment, the main operations of each layer should be 
investigated for its protection. The main link layer operations are one hop connectivity 
and frame transmission [17]. Link layer security protocols should provide peer-to-peer 
security between directly connected nodes and secure frame transmissions by 
automating  critical security operations including node authentication, frame encryption, 
data integrity verification and node availability.  
 
2.2. Security Issues in the Network layer 
The main network operations related to ad hoc networking are routing and data packet 
forwarding [3, 8]. The routing protocols exchange routing data between nodes and 
maintain routing states at each node accordingly. Based on the routing states, data 
packets are forwarded by intermediate nodes along an established route to the 
destination.  
 
In attacks related to routing protocols, the attackers can extract traffic towards certain 
destinations in compromised nodes, and forward packets along a route that is not 
optimal. The adversaries can also create routing loops in the network and introduce 
network congestion and channel contention in certain areas. There are still active 
research efforts in identifying and defending more sophisticated routing attacks [9, 23, 
25, 26, 26]. 
 
In addition to routing attacks, the adversary may launch attacks against packet 
forwarding operations. Such attacks cause the data packets to be delivered in a way that 
is inconsistent with the routing states. For example, the attacker along an established 
route may drop the packets, modify the content of the packets, or duplicate the packets 
it has already forwarded [13]. DoS is another type of attack that targets packet-
forwarding protocols and introduce wireless channel contention and network contention 
in ad hoc networks [4, 7, 23]. 
 
Current efforts towards the design of secure routing protocols are mainly focused on 
reactive routing protocols, such as in dynamic source routing (DSR) or ad-hoc on 
demand distance vector (AODV) [6, 21]. Reactive routing protocols have been 
demonstrated to perform better with significantly lower overheads than proactive 
protocols since they are able to react quickly to topology changes while keeping routing 
overhead low in periods or areas of the network in which changes are less frequent. 
Some of these are briefly described in the next few paragraphs.  
  
Current secure routing protocols proposed in the literature take into consideration active 
attacks performed by compromised nodes that aim at tampering with the execution of 
routing protocols whereas passive attacks and the selfishness problems are not 
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addressed. For example, the SRP [3, 8], which is a reactive protocol, guarantees the 
acquisition of correct topological information. It uses a hybrid key distribution based on 
the public keys of the communicating parties. It suffers, however, from the lack of a 
validation mechanism for route maintenance messages [13, 22].    
 
Another reactive secure ad hoc routing protocol ARIADNE [8, 25], which is based on 
[6], guarantees point-to-point authentication using a keyed message authentication code 
(MAC). Next, the ARAN [8] secure routing protocol detects and protects against 
malicious actions carried out by third parties and peers in the ad hoc environment. It 
protects against exploits using modification, fabrication and impersonation but the use 
of asymmetric cryptography makes it a very costly protocol to use in terms of CPU and 
energy usage.  
 
SEAD [26], on the other hand, is a proactive protocol based on the destination 
sequenced distance vector protocol that deals with attackers who modify routing 
information. It makes use of efficient one-way hash functions rather than relying on 
expensive asymmetric cryptography operations [8]. SEAD does not cope with the 
wormhole attack and the authors propose, as in the ARIADNE protocol, to use a 
different protocol to detect the threat [8, 26].     
 
3. Multifold Node Authentication  
The existing proposals in ad hoc networks are typically attack-oriented since they first 
identify several security threats and then enhance the existing protocol or propose a new 
protocol to challenge such threats. Because the solutions are designed explicitly with 
certain attack models in mind, they work well in the presence of designated attacks but 
may collapse under newborn attacks. It is essential, therefore, to design secure ad hoc 
networks that will result in multiple lines of defense against both known and unknown 
security threats. 
 
As mentioned in section 2 and also shown in Table 1, link layer operations involve one-
hop connectivity and frame transmission, whereas network layer operations include 
routing and data packet forwarding. These operations comprise of the link and the 
network security mechanisms that can integrate a multifold node authentication 
approach consisting of two phases. The operations of either link or network layer can 
enable one of the two phases to take place. In phase-one, for example, the node 
authentication procedure attempts to determine the true identity of the communicating 
nodes through a non-interactive zero knowledge protocol. Likewise, in phase-two the 
authentication procedure seeks again the identities of the communicating nodes through 
a challenge-response protocol.  
 
It is essential to mention that there are several authentication protocols available in the 
literature that can be applied to MANETs. However, it is necessary to use non-
interactive and low complexity protocols that will not create extra computational 
overhead in the network. For example, a provably secure authentication scheme can be 
considered as a “good” candidate at the first phase. Such a scheme is preferable to a 
computationally secure authentication scheme because its security relies on the apparent 
intractability of a well known computational problem (i.e. discrete logarithm problem) 
and does not necessarily require the use of a symmetric or an asymmetric encryption 
algorithm at this early stage [1, 4]. Therefore, authentication can be achieved with a 
zero knowledge protocol, similar to [16] that provide such characteristics.    
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The idea of such cryptographic protocols is that they allow a claimant, a node in 
MANET context, to demonstrate knowledge of a secret while revealing no information 
whatsoever of use to the verifying node even if the claimant node misbehaves in the 
protocol. In such protocols, nodes must exchange multiple messages, also referred to as 
interactive, where proof is probabilistic rather than absolute. However, interactive zero 
protocols are not suitable for wireless environments since they exchange multiple 
messages and result to the reduction of network performance. MANETs are suitable for 
non-interactive zero knowledge protocols where nodes do not need to exchange 
multiple messages to prove their identity. 
 
In the second phase of the authentication, node authentication is essential before routing 
information is ready to be sent. A computationally secure authentication scheme is 
preferable than a provably secure authentication scheme because it requires the use of a 
symmetric or asymmetric key encryption algorithm. It is necessary to use an encryption 
algorithm to authenticate nodes since it is the last procedure before information is 
exchanged between communicating nodes. Thus, the security in multifold node 
authentication will not rely only on the apparent intractability of a single computational 
problem. A challenge-response protocol can be chosen where users and nodes can prove 
their identities by demonstrating knowledge of a shared secret known to be associated 
with them. 
3.1. First Phase 
The multifold node authentication design adopts cryptographic methods to offer 
multiple protection lines to communicating nodes. When one or more nodes are 
connected to a MANET, the first phase of node-to-node authentication procedure takes 
place. At this early stage, it is necessary to be able to determine the true identity of the 
nodes which could possibly gain access to a secret key later on. Let us consider the 
MANET of Figure 1 with the authenticated nodes A, B, and C. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1a, when node X1 enters the MANET, it will be authenticated 
by both nodes that will exchange routing information later on in the second phase (i.e. B 
and C). When two nodes e.g. X1 and X2 enter the MANET simultaneously (Figure 1b), 
they will both be authenticated by valid nodes. Even though we refer to nodes entering 
simultaneously there will always be a small time difference in their entrance to the 
network. When X1 enters slightly before X2, then X1 gets authenticated first by nodes 
B and C, making X1 a valid node and next X2 gets authenticated by nodes B and X1. 
 
When two or more nodes are simultaneously connected to a MANET (e.g. Figure 1b) 
there will still be a fraction of time that X1, for example, will enter the network first and 
will be authenticated. Once X1 and X2 have been authenticated by valid nodes, they 
will also authenticate each other since routing and packet forwarding data will be sent to 
or received by them.  
 
In Figure 1a for example, X1 can prove its identity to B and C ensuring that the discrete 
logarithms, 111
xy α=  and 222 xy α= , to the bases 21,αα , satisfy the linear Equation 1, 
 
 ( )pbxkxk mod2211 =⋅+⋅   (1) 
for integers 1k , 2k  and prime number p [16]. 
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In the protocol, X1 first computes 333
xy α= , 444 xy α=  and solves Equation 2, for 
integers 43, xx .  
 ( )pxkxk mod04231 =⋅+⋅  (2) 
 
Then, as shown below, 
 
B, C ← X1 : 315 xy α= , 426 xy α=      (M1) 
B, C → X1 : ( ) 765212121 ,,,,,,,, yyybkkyyH =αα    (M2) 
B, C ← X1 : ( )pxyxy mod1738 ⋅−= , ( )pxyxy mod2749 ⋅−=   (M3) 
 
 
X1 sends 5y  and 6y
 
to B and C. Upon reception of message (M1), B and C compute 7y  
with one way hash function and sends message (M2) to X1. Next, X1 checks the 
validity of (M1), constructs message (M3) and sends 8y , 9y  to B and C.  
 
X1 convinces B and C that he/she knows the discrete algorithms of 1y  and 2y  to the 
bases 1α  and 2α , respectively, and that these logarithms satisfy a linear equation. This 
can be done by verifying the resulting proof ),,( 987 yyy . It can be easily seen that B and 
C, will always succeed in constructing a valid proof by first reconstructing 
78
1110
yy yy ⋅=α , 79 2211 yy yy ⋅=α , then checking whether 7y  is equal to 12y , for ( ) 121110212121 ,,,,,,,, yyybkkyyH =αα , and if Equation 3 is valid.   
  ( )pbyykyk mod79281 ⋅−=⋅+⋅  (3) 
 
First, it can be easily seen that B and C will always succeed in constructing a valid proof 
since 510 yy =  and 611 yy =  
  
5111
,
1110
371173
18
78 yyy xyxxyx
yy
yy ==⋅=⋅= ⋅⋅− αααα  
6222
,
2211
472274
29
79 yyy xyxxyx
yy
yy ==⋅=⋅= ⋅⋅− αααα . 
 
Thus,  
 ( ) ( ) 765212121111021212112 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, yyybkkyyHyybkkyyHy === αααα  
 
Hence, B and C calculate 12y  and compares it with 7y  in message (M2).  
 
Second, assume that an intruder E who does not know 1x  and 2x  was able to compute 
such proofs. Since the one-way hash function 7y  is hard to invert, we can assume that 
the values 10y  and 11y  were fixed before 7y  in message (M2) was computed. It also 
seems necessary that when fixing the values 10y  and 11y , B and C were prepared to 
compute a proof for many other possible messages. But this means that E could also 
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compute different representations of 10y  and 11y  to the bases 1α , 1y  and 2α , 2y  which 
implies the knowledge of 1x  and 2x , the discrete logarithms 1y , 2y  to the bases 1α , 2α , 
but this contradicts the assumption that the cheating E does not know 1x  and 2x .  
 
Furthermore, B and C verify whether the response 8y  and 9y , satisfies Equation 3. 
Thus, 
 ( ) ( )
( )( )pby xkxkyxkxk
xykxkxykxk
xyxkxyxkykyk
Eq
yy
mod7
2.
221174231
2724217131
27421731
,
9281
98
⋅−=
⋅+⋅⋅−⋅+⋅= ⋅⋅−⋅+⋅⋅−⋅=
⋅−⋅+⋅−⋅=+
 
 
and validates the identity of X1. 
 
3.2. Second Phase 
When routing information is ready to be transferred, the second phase of the multifold 
node authentication takes place. Authentication carries on in the available nodes starting 
with one-hop at a time from the source to destination route. While nodes in the source to 
destination path are authenticated, they can also agree on a secret key, which will be 
used to encrypt their traffic.   
 
Based on the zero knowledge protocol of section 3.1, integers 1x  and 2x  are known to 
all nodes and can be used here as a shared secret key. Hence, when symmetric 
techniques are applied mutual authentication between B and X1 (see Figure 1a) can be 
achieved based on ISO/IEC 9798-2: 
 
B ← X1 : 1r    (M1) 
B → X1 : ),,( 211 BrrEx  (M2) 
B ← X1 : ),( 122 rrEx   (M3) 
 
where E is a symmetric encryption algorithm and 1r , 2r  are random numbers.   
 
Node X1 generates a random number and sends it to B.  Upon reception of (M1), B 
encrypts the two random numbers and its identity and sends message (M2) to X1.  Next, 
X1 checks for its random number and then constructs (M3) and sends it to B.  Upon 
reception of (M3), B checks that both random numbers match those used earlier. The 
encryption algorithm in the above mechanism may be replaced by MAC, which is 
efficient and affordable for low-end devices, such as sensor nodes. However, MAC can 
be verified only by the intended receiving node, making it ineligible for broadcast 
message authentication.  
 
On the other hand, when asymmetric key techniques are applied, nodes own a key pair 
and mutual authentication between X1 and C (Figure 1a) can be achieved by using the 
modified Needham-Schoeder public key protocol [1] in the following way: 
 
X1 → C : )1,( 1 XrPC   (M1) 
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X1 ← C : ),( 211 rrPX   (M2) 
X1 → C : 2r    (M3) 
 
where P is a public key encryption algorithm and 1r , 2r  are random numbers.   
 
X1 and C exchange random numbers in messages (M1) and (M2) that are encrypted 
with their public keys. Upon decrypting messages (M1) and (M2), C and X1 achieve 
mutual authentication by checking that the random numbers recovered agree with the 
ones sent in messages (M3) and (M2) respectively. Note that the public key encryption 
algorithm can be replaced by an elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) or digital signatures. 
 
Digital signatures, however, involve much more computational overhead in signing, 
decrypting, verifying and encrypting operations. They are less resilient against DoS 
attacks since an attacker may launch a large number of bogus signatures to exhaust the 
victim’s computational resources for verifying them. Each node also needs to keep a 
certificate revocation list or revoked certificates and public keys of valid nodes. 
 
4. Implementation Results   
The multifold authentication solution poses grand yet exciting research challenges. 
Since a mobile communication system expects a best effort performance from each 
component, MANETs have to properly select authentication mechanisms for their nodes 
that fit well into their own available resources. It is necessary to identify the systems 
principles of how to build such link and network security mechanisms that will explore 
their methods and learn to prevent and react to threats accordingly. 
 
The analysis presented in this section targets to compare the execution time of well 
known authentication protocols for the purposes of multifold authentication. The 
described protocols in sections 3.1 and 3.2 were simulated following the MANET 
infrastructure of Figure 1a. The zero knowledge and challenge-response authentication 
protocols were simulated in an OPNET network simulator, whereas the encryption 
algorithms were implemented in a digital signal processor (DSP). The testbed consisted 
of an IBM compatible PC, in which OPNET was installed, and two parallel 36303 
Motorola DSPs (66MHz), in which encryption and decryption were performed.  
 
Symmetric, asymmetric and elliptic curve cryptosystems were implemented to offer a 
complete analysis of the authentication protocols of section 3.2. The advanced 
encryption standard (AES), RSA, and Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystems were used as 
symmetric, asymmetric key and elliptic curve algorithms respectively. The key size was 
based on X9.30 standard specifications.  
 
As illustrated in Table 2 and as specified in the current draft of the revision of X9.30, 
for reasonable secure 128-bit AES, 2048-bit and 224-bit are the “appropriate” key sizes 
for RSA, when the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used, and for ECC, 
respectively [1, 27, 28]. Note that in the results of Table 2, the AES key setup routine is 
slower for decryption than for encryption; for RSA encryption, we assume the use of a 
public exponent e = 65537 while ECC uses an optimal normal base curve [1, 4].   
 
Table 3 shows the time it is required for a node to be authenticated, when a combination 
of cryptographic protocols is used in the first and second phase. For example, when a 
node enters a MANET, it can be authenticated by a zero knowledge protocol similar to 
the one in section 3.1. It is not recommended, however, for nodes to follow exactly the 
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same authentication procedure in phase two when routing information is ready to be 
transferred. This is because the authentication procedure that was successful once is 
most likely to succeed again without increasing security.  
 
Notice that when exactly the same authentication procedure is deployed in both phases, 
the total execution time is faster (i.e. 42.82ms, 96.44ms, 340.28ms and 290.34ms) than 
the execution time of combined cryptographic techniques (i.e. 129.26ms, 383.10ms and 
33.16ms). Considering that the authentication procedure that was successful once is 
most likely to succeed again without increasing security, a combination of zero 
knowledge and challenge-response authentication techniques appears to be a 
recommended option when link and network layers operations are taking place.  
 
In such circumstances, the decision of whether to use zero knowledge with symmetric 
or asymmetric key techniques can be determined by timing analysis and therefore node 
resources. Note that, no consideration was taken regarding to the physical connection 
link between DSPs and the PC in the total timing and different implementation will 
yield to different results. In addition, the zero knowledge and challenge-response total 
execution time was considered for one-hop connectivity. In the case of broadcast 
messaging, packets were dropped by the neighboring nodes in a table-driven routing 
protocol without affecting the execution time of the authentication procedure. 
Moreover, no timing differences were observed in different network loads. 
 
The analysis presented in Table 3 evaluates multiple authentication fences in MANETs 
and offers new application opportunities. The effectiveness of each authentication 
operation and the minimal number of fences the system has to pose to ensure some 
degree of security assurance was evaluated through simulations analysis and 
measurement in principle.  
 
Even though the results of this section were obtained by specific zero knowledge and 
challenge-response protocols useful information can be drawn. MANET security 
designers are able to determine whether to use multiple authentication techniques or not. 
They can also decide on which combination of zero knowledge and challenge-response 
technique to apply on their applications.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Security of MANET has become a more sophisticated problem than security of other 
networks, due to the open nature and lack of infrastructure of ad hoc networks. Current 
research efforts on ad hoc networks follow a hierarchical approach, where the most 
explored area involves secure routing protocols. Authentication and key management 
mechanisms, on the other side, are explored less than routing protocols, whereas the 
least explored research area relates to link security protocols. 
 
Since mobile ad hoc networks can be formed, merged together or partitioned into 
separate networks on the fly, security becomes more sophisticated. Security 
requirements, such as authenticity should focus on the operations of both link and 
network layers. In this article, we explored the security issues of MANETs and 
integrated cryptographic mechanisms in the first and second phase that helped to design 
multiple lines of defense and further protect ad hoc networks against malicious attacks. 
 
Designing such cryptographic mechanisms as zero knowledge and challenge-response 
protocols, which are efficient in the sense of both computational and message overhead, 
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is the main research objective in the area of authentication and key management for ad 
hoc networks. For instance in wireless sensing, designing efficient cryptographic 
mechanisms for authentication and key management in broadcast and multicast 
scenarios may poses a challenge. The execution time of specific protocols was 
examined and useful results were obtained when multiple lines of defence were applied.    
 
Once the authentication and key management infrastructure is in place, data 
confidentiality and integrity issues can be tackled by using existing and efficient 
symmetric algorithms since there is no need to develop any special integrity and 
encryption algorithms for ad hoc networks.    
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Figure 1 – New Nodes in MANET 
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Table 1 – Security in Data Link and Network Layers 
 
 
Cryptographic 
Algorithms 
Key  
Length 
Encryption 
(500-bit) 
Decryption 
(500-bit) 
AES 128-bit  20ms 23ms 
RSA (with CRT) 2048-bit 50ms 120ms  
ECC Menezes-Vanstone 224-bit 72ms 68ms 
 
Table 2 – Timing Analysis of Encryption Algorithms for Specific Key Size 
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Two-Phase Authentication First Phase Second Phase Total Remarks 
2 x Zero Knowledge (ZK) 
(Section 3.1) 
(ZK) 
21.41 ± 2ms 
(ZK) 
21.41 ± 2ms  42.82 ± 5ms 
Not 
Recommended 
2 x ISO/IEC 9798-2 (AES) 
(Section 3.2) 
(9798-2-AES) 
43.22 ± 2ms 
(9798-2-AES) 
43.22 ± 2ms 96.44 ± 5ms 
Not 
Recommended 
2 x Needham-Schroeder  
(NS-RSA) (Section 3.2) 
(NS-RSA) 
170.14 ± 2ms 
(NS-RSA) 
170.14 ± 3ms 340.28 ± 5ms 
Not 
Recommended 
2 x Needham-Schroeder  
(NS-ECC) (Section 3.2) 
(NS-ECC) 
145.17 ± 3ms 
(NS-ECC) 
145.17 ± 2ms 290.34 ± 5ms 
Not 
Recommended 
ZK & 9798-2-AES (ZK)  64.63 ± 2ms 
(9798-2-AES) 
64.63 ± 2ms 129.26 ± 5ms Recommended 
ZK & NS-RSA (ZK)  191.55 ± 2ms 
(NS-RSA) 
191.55 ± 2ms 383.10 ± 5ms Recommended 
ZK & NS-ECC (ZK)  166.58 ± 2ms 
(NS-ECC) 
166.58 ± 2ms 333.16 ± 5ms Recommended 
 
Table 3 – Timing Analysis of Multifold Node Authentication 
 
 
 
